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ABSTRACT

The analysis of 1972 data on political participation levels of 629 women investigates the impact of feminism on the political attitudes and behavior of its supporters, and the direction of that impact. Feminism is interpreted as a social movement which combines a focus upon individual change with political and systemic change. Major hypotheses were that feminists would: (1) express low political trust; (2) have a higher level of life satisfaction than non-feminists; (3) be more politically efficacious than non-feminists. A three-part political participation index was constructed to statistically analyze voter turnout, traditional political participation, and community organizational activity. Variables investigated include life satisfaction, political trust, political efficacy, protest approval, perception of government responsiveness, employment and marital status, and age. Findings indicated statistically significant differences between feminists and non-feminists with all variables except political trust--which does, however, decrease in feminists as political participation increases. Most strikingly, the socioeconomic profile of feminists indicates higher educational attainment, income, social class, and employment status. The conclusion is that the impact of feminism is not a random one, and that the feminist movement encourages political participation. (Author/DB)

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POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF FEMINISM:

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION AND ALIENATION

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SP 010 508

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Introduction*

Political change in the United States has often been the result, either directly or indirectly, of social movements. A substantial amount of evidence seems to point to the notion that most social reforms in the United States are closely related to organized movements of one form or another.[1] As Etzioni has said, "change almost invariably involves an element of conscious, deliberate effort by one or more elites,"[2] even though these elites are not necessarily members of that somewhat amorphous category known as "the Establishment." Social movements act to politicize various forms of conflict--economic, social, political. In so doing, they act as change agents in what Schattschneider refers to as the essential democratic process of socializing conflict.[3]

Feminism, one of the most public social movements in modern history, presents a clear illustration of the often tortuous process by which social movements work to bring about social and political change. Its focus seems to be as much upon individual change as upon political or systemic change. While addressing the system and its faults, it simultaneously addresses the individual and encourages her to reassess who she is and what she might do to affect change in her own life situation. It acts as the intersection between personal and social change which, as Freeman has said, is precisely what the successful social movement does.[4] Personal change can function as a sturdy foundation for broader social and political change.

The key focus of this paper is upon whether feminism is functioning as such a change agent. Specifically, the study asks if the cumulative individual effects of the feminist movement appear to be affecting broader political phenomenon in any significant way. Centrally, the paper focuses upon political behavior or participation. Secondarily, it focuses upon related political attitudes such as efficacy, trust, perceptions of government attentiveness and protest approval, and upon psychological attitudes of life satisfaction and internal control (self-directedness). It attempts to suggest ways in which feminism acts as a key antecedent or intervening variable between small-scale individual, personal change and broader social, political change. It is an empirical attempt to measure some part of the political impact of the women's movement in its early stages.

Feminism is, above all else, a social movement.[5] It has broadly based support and it also has, or is based upon, a fairly consistent ideology.[6] Because of this it seems plausible to argue that feminism has more to disclose concerning political attitudes and behavior of its followers compared to other women than sex alone has to tell us about differences between the sexes.[7]

* I wish to acknowledge my appreciation to the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their financial support of computer time required for this paper and my sincere gratitude to my dissertation advisor, Jack Dennis, for his continued support, advice and encouragement.

Based on the general ideology of the women's movement as expressed in feminist writings and in the popular press, several hypotheses can be posited. (1) Feminism is, among other things, a "consciousness-raising" movement. It attempts to heighten individual awareness of sex stereotyping, sex-based discrimination, sexist language and cultural patterns. Many women experiencing such sensitization become more cynical, skeptical and questioning of the system than they were formerly. In short, they become less trustful. Specifically, such distrust is aimed frequently at situations and persons where the unjust exercise of power is perceived. Thus, our first hypothesis is that feminism should be associated with low political trust.

(2) Another side of the consciousness-raising coin is an effort to heighten the self-esteem of women. Feminism hopes to enhance the pride and self-confidence women have in themselves, to increase the number of life-style and occupational options they see open to them, and to sensitize them to the talents and abilities they possess but may not yet have tapped or may have undervalued. Hence, we hypothesize greater life satisfaction among feminists than among non-feminists.

(3) Assertiveness training, activism at home and in other more overtly political arenas, is another component of feminist tactics. As a consequence, we hypothesize that feminists are likely to feel more politically efficacious than non-feminists and to perceive of themselves as exercising more internal controls in the functioning of their day-to-day life than will non-feminists.[8]

(4) Feminism also preaches activism and self-assertion in the greater political arena. Such reform oriented feminist organizations as NOW, NWPC and WEAL[9] explicitly function as lobbyists for and against legislation which members perceive to affect women's interests. Component organizations engage in letter-writing campaigns, stage demonstrations, support candidates for political office and work actively in other political efforts. If feminism's rhetoric and example are influential, then we might expect feminist supporters to be emulating the example of these organizations and actively pursuing their own interests in political ways. Our last hypothesis, then, is that political participation should be higher among feminists than among non-feminists.

The Problem

Feminism focuses simultaneously upon the personal and the traditionally political. It encourages a politicization of what before has generally been privatized--much as did the black civil rights movement of the 1960s. Such traditions as where one sits, who serves or cleans up from the meal, how one is addressed, where one can eat and drink, even the position one assumes in the sex act, are all objects of reevaluation and political debate in feminism. What has newly been defined as political is also negotiable. The scope of what is defined as political, as symbolic, is expanded significantly. Much that once was assumed is basically questioned. Feminism encourages women to trust less, to think more highly of themselves, to recognize the breadth of resources they possess and to actively affect change in their personal lives and in the system of which they are a part.

In very basic ways feminism appears to contain within it core tenets that relate integrally to the individual's understanding of and participation in the political system. But such attitudinal and behavioral differences could presage either of two contrasting trends among feminists: either greater political participation or greater political alienation.

If feminism is enhancing political efficacy and strong self-esteem among women it is theoretically likely that greater participation will result.[10] If, however, feminism is encouraging women to distrust the system and if the effects of such distrust are stronger than the effects of enhanced efficacy and self-esteem, then lower participation and greater alienation are more likely consequences.[11] After all, if one perceives that officials are not trustworthy or that the system itself does not respond, why bother to work towards change within that system? Why expend efforts one believes are doomed to fail?

In part we have here a question of intensity. Which works stronger effects upon the individual: a belief of distrust in persons or the system, or a belief in one's capacity to bring about change?[12] Feminism could succeed at influencing its followers in a politically relevant way and either of these two alternatives could result: greater participation or greater alienation. Our task is to determine, empirically, which of these results appears to be occurring.

Methods, Data and Subjects

Secondary data analysis was performed on the 1972 ICPSR Election Study conducted by the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. A probability sample, N=1109, composed of 629 women and 480 men was drawn from the national electorate. For this analysis, women respondents were subdivided into feminists and non-feminists based on the index reported below.

Research proceeded on the assumption that if effects of feminism were distributed randomly throughout the female population, then no group effects would be statistically significant when a difference of means tests was applied to the two groups. If, however, effects were not so randomly distributed then comparative measures of political participation levels should provide some indication as to the direction of these effects--i.e., greater participation or greater political alienation.

Based on items in Form II of the survey, several possible indices of feminism were factor analyzed.[13] The index with the greatest ideological consistency and the highest factor loadings was one consisting of the following 11 items:

1. Should men and women have an equal role in politics and society or is woman's place in the home?
2. Men are born with more drive to be ambitious and successful than women.
3. Women have less opportunity than men to get the education they need for top jobs.
4. Women are usually less reliable on the job than men because they tend to be absent more and quit more often.
5. Our schools teach women to want the less important jobs.
6. By nature, women are happiest when they are making a home and caring for children.

7. Many women can't get good jobs; men with the same skills have much less trouble.
8. Our society discriminates against women.
9. Women have just as much chance to get big and important jobs; they just aren't interested.
10. Taking all things together, which do you think has a better life in the U.S. today, men or women?
11. In many respects, equality has gone too far in this country.

Coding for this index was simply additive. The first item was scored on a seven point scale with "7" being the response, 'men and women should have equal roles', and "1" representing agreement with the statement that 'woman's place is in the home'. The next 10 items were scored on a five point scale with '5' being the most feminist response and '1' being the least feminist response. Items 2, 4, 6, 9 and 11 are scored '5' for a response of "disagree a great deal." The other items are reverse scored with '5' being coded for a response of "agree a great deal." Item 10 was scored '5' for a response of "men," and '1' for a response of "women." See Table 1.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

The range for the index was 11 to 57 with a mean of 33.7. The frequency distribution of this variable was approximately normal. An arbitrary cut-off point was selected at integer 39 so that the top 30% (approximately) of the scores were selected as indicative of feminists, and the lower 70% as non-feminists. The N for feminists was 183, for non-feminists the N = 446.

It should be clear by now that the feminist index used here is an attitudinal or ideological one. It is not based upon organizational activism in traditional and somewhat elitist feminist groups. It reflects a certain world view, a predisposition, and may be argued to infer the kinds of constraints upon one's opinions that Converse so strongly defended in his discussion of mass belief systems.[14] However, the crux of our index is not that these women are necessarily constrained political ideologues, but, rather, that they probably exhibit a certain consistency in attitudes and behavior which should differentiate them in certain measureable ways from women who do not substantially share this complex of opinions.

Using the feminist and non-feminist partitions of the sample as well as the unsplit group of all men or all women, a series of regression models was run to test a path analysis model of political participation, the results of which follow later in the paper.

The political participation index consisted of three parts: a total for vote turnout, a total for traditional political participation, and a total for local community organizational activity. Other variables or indices were traditionally coded. They included party identification, age, marital status, socio-economic-status, current employment status, education, political protest approval, political efficacy, political trust, internal versus external control, life satisfaction and perception of government attentiveness. More detail concerning these is provided in sections of the findings dealing with that particular variable.

The range of political phenomenon examined here is constrained clearly by two factors. The first is methodological--only one time point is available for this study.[15] The second constraint is theoretical. Although a wide

variety of political phenomenon or psychological attitudes could be investigated on a priori reasons, only certain ones are likely to be affected by feminist thinking. Some theoretical rationale had to exist associating a political or psychological variable with feminism and with political participation for it to be included in the model investigated in this study.

Findings and Discussion

Feminists

When feminists were compared to non-feminists on a variety of sociological variables, some clear distinctions and surprising similarities were uncovered. Table 2 presents these findings. First, the similarities.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Political philosophy and party identification of the two groups did not differ significantly. Although feminists perceive of themselves as liberal in slightly greater proportions than do non-feminists, no basic or statistically significant differences were found. To our surprise, even less difference was found in the political party identification of the two groups. The popular press image of feminists generally as a liberal and predominantly Democratic group of women turned out not to be the case. We also expected feminists to be low in the proportion of black supporters they could claim. This, too, proved invalid. Racial composition of the two groups was almost identical.

But clear and statistically significant differences between feminists and non-feminists were found. Most strikingly, the socio-economic profile of the two groups is distinct. Feminists were higher in their overall educational attainment, in their annual family income, in their self rating of social class and in their employment status. We find that in 1972 over 40% of all non-feminists had an annual family income of under $10,000 but only 21% of feminists fell into that category. Similarly, where 30% of non-feminists had an income of $15,000 or over, nearly 50% of all feminists were so endowed. Our feminists clearly have greater financial resources at their disposal as a group than do the non-feminists.

Educational differences are even more striking. Half the non-feminists have not graduated from high school. A small 15% of feminists fall into this group. Similarly, where only 5% of non-feminists had a college education, over 20% of feminists were educated at this level. Education seems to be our clearest predictor of feminism.

Self-perception of social class reflects these differences as well. Feminists are much less likely than non-feminists to describe themselves as belonging to the "working class," and significantly more likely to belong to the 'middle' or 'upper middle' class. The gamma of .32 shows this relationship to be a moderately strong one. Table 3 presents means comparisons which highlight these differences further.

Feminists are significantly high in all three of these measures of socio-economic difference. The popular press image is supported. Feminists are not a true cross-section of American women in this regard and do appear to represent a certain, and perhaps previously untapped, elite. When we consider Cooley's projection that the values of the middle or

upper middle class defuse downward within one generation in many instances, the political attitudes of this group take on greater, not lesser, significance.[16]

We also see that feminists are far more likely to be working women than are non-feminists and much less likely to describe themselves as "housewives." Almost 60% of our feminists were employed in 1972 compared to only about half that proportion of non-feminists. The reverse relationship applies to the proportions of each group who say they are housewives. Two notions deserve comment here. The first is that these findings on employment differences between the two groups help explain the socio-economic differences already described. Feminist women themselves are helping to contribute to the economic status of their families in most instances by their own personal employment. Secondly, it well may be that this fact alone goes far to explain the strength of support found in this group for women's or feminist issues. Perhaps the very nature of employment, which involves women outside the home in the economic and power spheres of men to varying extents, has confronted these women with perceptions of inequity in treatment between the sexes which a far smaller proportion of non-feminist women have had the good or ill-fortune to confront first-hand.

A few other clear differences between the two groups are noteworthy. Feminists are more evenly distributed in terms of national geographic distribution than are non-feminists. The latter group contains a disproportionate number of women from the South, as Table 2 shows and far fewer women from the New England and Middle Atlantic region which comprise the "East" than one would expect given the proportion of the national population located in the area.

Marital status on the other hand yields interesting statistics without much strength. About all we can say is that feminists are more likely to be single and far less likely to be widowed, both of which says more about an age differential than marital differences. And age differences are clear. The mean age for feminists is 39 whereas for non-feminists it jumps to 47, a difference significant at the .01 level. The percentage breakdowns of women in various age brackets in Table 2 substantiate this.

Thus, we are left with a profile of feminist women as women basically no different from non-feminists with regard to their general political philosophy, their party identification, or their race. We find that as a group feminists are higher in socio-economic status measured on a variety of indices, that they are significantly less likely to come from the South than are non-feminists, and that they are markedly more likely to be employed. They are younger women overall and more likely to be single than is true for the non-feminists. Demographic differences were relatively clear between our two comparison groups.

Before discussing the findings with reference to psychological attitudes, political attitudes and political behavior in depth, a comparison of means table will give the reader an overview as to which differences between the two groups are significant.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

As the reader will note, only political trust, party identification and happiness showed insignificant statistical means differences between our two comparison groups. Differences clearly exist with regard to the psychological and political variables we wish to explore. We move now to present and discuss our findings on the strength of the associations under study.

Psychological Attitudes

Our argument says that feminist ideology is likely to influence certain psychological perceptions women have of themselves, that these perceptions logically relate to certain political attitudes, and that these psychological and political attitudes both should be associated with certain political behaviors. We begin with a set of three pyschological attitudes which theoretically relate to feminism and its ideology. Rather than attempting any direct, and hard to defend, survey measure of self-esteem as a unified construct, these three separate but related measures were selected.

Feminism explicitly hopes to affect the self-esteem of its supporters, either by enhancing or buttressing it. One way it hopes to do this is by increasing the individual's control over her (or his) own life, as contrasted to a sense of having one's life controlled by external forces such as luck, fate, or the like. This index we refer to as the "locus of control" or "internal versus external control" variable. The following items comprised this index:

1. "Do you think it's better to plan your life a good way ahead, or would you say life is too much a matter of luck to plan ahead very far?" Scored 1 to 5. 5 represents a "plan ahead" response; 1 represents a "matter of luck" response.

2. "When you plan, do you usually get to carry out things the way you expected or do things usually come up to make you change your plans?" Scored 1 to 5. 5 represents "get to carry out things".

3. "Have you usually felt pretty sure your life would work out the way you want it to, or have there been times when you haven't been sure about it?" Scored 1 to 5. 5 represents "pretty sure."

4. "Some people feel they can run their lives pretty much the way they want to. Others feel the problems of life are sometimes too big for them. Which ones are you most like?" Scored 1 to 5 with 5 representing "can run own life."

The second measure related to self-esteem included in our equations was a measure of total life satisfaction. Specifically, the respondent was asked to evaluate his or her satisfaction with the following: life as a whole, health, respect shown the respondent by others, how leisure time was spent, chances for getting a good job, respondent's sex life, accomplishments, and the handling of personal problems. Each item was scored on a 7-point scale with a high score indicating high satisfaction, a low score indicating low satisfaction. Scores ranged from 8 to 56.

The third component of these measures was the "happiness" index which summed responses to how proud, how pleased, and how happy the respondent indicated he or she had felt in the past few weeks. Scored on a scale of 1 to 5, a 5 indicated a high happiness response and a 1, a low happiness response. Preliminary data analysis showed this variable not to be predictive for any partition of the data (i.e., feminists, non-feminists, all women or men) and, therefore, it was deleted from the path model and all succeeding regression equations.[16] As noted in Table 3 feminists as a group were slightly less happy than non-feminists, but the difference was not significant statistically.

On the other hand, the two remaining psychological variables of internal control and life satisfaction did prove to be significantly predictive with regard to political variables, but not with regard to feminism. Using the partition of all women, regression equations showed the internal control index to be very weakly predictive of feminism. When internal control was set as a dependent variable, feminism was an equally weak predictor of it. When the feminist and non-feminist partitions were used the same relationships applied. This implied an interactive effect between the two and lent support to the notion that the two variables are temporally related. Neither appeared to be prior to and, hence, potentially causal of, the other. Feminism may buttress high internal control among women, but no support was given for the notion that it caused it. Rather, it may simply attract to it a high preponderance of women already characterized by a sense of strong internal control.

The comparison of means between feminists and non-feminists (Table 3) showed us that feminists have a significantly higher level of perceived internal control than do non-feminists. We can argue that as the individual's commitment to and practice of feminist values is increased, this sense of internal control well might be strengthened. But our data do not present defendable support for such a notion at this point.

Findings related to life satisfaction present a different picture, however. The correlation between feminism and life satisfaction is a very moderate one ($r = .282$). When entered into the equations as an independent variable against feminism, very little of the variance was explained for the whole sample or for either of the two partitions of feminist and non-feminist women. But when entered as a dependent variable in a path model, its predictors differ markedly for these two samples.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

For feminists, life satisfaction is most predicted by their sense of internal control. (See Table 4) Not only do feminists have a higher average level of life satisfaction, but also their sense of internal control appears to contribute to that life satisfaction in a very substantial way. For non-feminists the relationship is still significant but much less strong. Interestingly, an inverse relationship appears to hold between the political trust of feminists and their life satisfaction. As their political trust decreases their sense of life satisfaction increases. But this may say more about their sense of control (in spite of obstacles) than it says about life satisfaction. Likewise, the negative relationship between party identification and life satisfaction, which says that the more a feminist tends to be Democrat the more satisfied she is with her life, may also be a spurious one. We have no theoretical reason to argue why Democratic feminists are more likely than Republican feminists to be satisfied with their life!

Perhaps what is most striking about the comparison is the role of feminism as an independent variable affecting the life satisfaction of non-feminists. Including only the most feminist women in our partition for feminists, the feminism scale was not predictive of the life satisfaction of this group. With a range of 27 remaining in the non-feminist portion of this index (the dividing point on the scale was 38 in a range of 11-57),

however, feminism was a significant predictor of the level of life satisfaction expressed by non-feminists. That is, the higher a non-feminist scored on the feminist index, the more likely she was to score high on total life satisfaction as well. Even after entering other variables in the regression equations, such as education, political efficacy and the like, feminism continued to be predictive for non-feminists. For the total sample of females, feminism predicted life satisfaction consistently. (Simple R = .17, beta = .16, sig = .001.) It is important to note that even with education in the equation (R = .10) feminism continues to be strongly predictive of life satisfaction.

Furthermore, the psychological variables of internal control and life satisfaction show strong relationships with most of the political variables considered. As Table 5 shows, internal control is strongly associated with all of the political variables except for protest approval. Life satisfaction associates moderately with political efficacy, belief in government attentiveness and total political participation. These relationships hold for both the feminist and non-feminist group with only slight modifications.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Psychological effects on political trust differ between the two groups as Table 5 shows. Non-feminists who are satisfied with their life or who feel a sense of internal control are more likely to be trustful of the political system than are feminists with similar characteristics. Greater life satisfaction does not bring with it higher political trust for feminists although it does for non-feminists.

High internal control for feminists is also less likely to be associated with rising political trust than is true for non-feminists. Other factors must affect political trust for feminists. Similarly, the sense of government attentiveness among feminists is less related to their overall life satisfaction than is true for non-feminists. For them, a strong sense of inner controls is more predictive of a belief in government attentiveness. For both groups the psychological perception that they, not fate, regulate their life is strongly related to their belief that government can and will respond, to their sense that personally they can be effective politically, and to the likelihood that they will participate politically.

Political Attitudes

Political Trust.

Although the difference between the mean for political trust of feminists compared to non-feminists was not a significant one, the predictors of political trust in the regression results for the two groups did differ significantly. As Table 6 shows, party identification plays a moderate role in the political trust of feminists, with a rise in political trust being associated with a rise in Republican identification, a not surprising association when one remembers that this is the pre-Watergate Nixon presidency. Rising political trust also associates with a decrease in protest approval for feminists and with a rise in sense of political efficacy.

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

For non-feminists, political efficacy is the only one of the values predictive of trust for feminists that is also predictive for non-feminists.

The small but consistent relationship found between feminist political trust and Republican party identification, does not hold for non-feminists. Socio-economic status does play such a role for them, as does a sense of internal control. Neither of these two relationships hold for feminists.

It is interesting to note that a rise in socio-economic-status associates with a rise in political trust for non-feminists when they have markedly lower status overall. The fact that this relationship does not apply to the feminists does allow for the conjecture that other factors are operating among feminists to retard this association, especially when we recall that the relationship between high political trust and high economic status has generally held for a variety of groups in the past.[17] Thus, we find that although the difference in means for political trust between the two groups is not significant, different relationships apply to the political trust of each.

Government Attentiveness.

The government attentiveness index was formed by summing 5 items which asked the respondent how much attention they felt that a particular agency of the government paid attention to what the people think. The institutions referred to were 1) the government, 2) political parties, 3) elections, 4) Congressmen (sic), and 5) interest groups. The scale ranged from 5 to 25 with a high score indicative of a perception of high government attentiveness.

As already noted, feminists were significantly higher in average perception of government attentiveness ($\bar{X}$ = 16.6) than were non-feminists ($\bar{X}$ = 14.6). Furthermore, we found through regression analysis that feminism has a significant association on such perceptions. As the score on the feminism index rose, so did the score on the government attentiveness index (r = .15 for feminists). The stronger women's feminism was, the more likely they were to perceive the government as attentive to what the people think. See Table 7

INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

For feminists, feminism is a moderate and statistically significant "predictor" of perceptions of government attentiveness. For some reason, feminism seems to be tapping a political orientation that makes some sense out of the way the system works. The differences in the results of the regression equations for the feminist and non-feminist groups flushes out some of the possible rationale involved.

The key question to be asked appears to be why feminists, who are no more politically trusting than non-feminists in any statistically significant way, should be so much higher in their perception of the government's attentiveness to what people think? Part of the answer seems to lie in the nature of the two measures. The political trust index is composed of items whose subject is "people in the government" or "people running the government." Its referrent is to officials, incumbents. It is not a systemic evaluation as is the measure of government attentiveness. The latter refers to institutions, to "the government", not to individuals. On another level, the political trust items could be said to be specific support items and the government attentiveness items to be closer measures of diffuse support.[18] The differences between feminists and non-feminists on their level of perceived government attentiveness seems most explainable when combined with feminists'

higher levels of internal control and political efficacy. It seems logical to argue that women who feel a high sense of internal control and a high sense of political efficacy are likely to believe that the system does attend (and that they, perhaps, can assist in making it attend) to what the people think. This may hold even though feminists are not particularly trustful of the specific officeholders in power at any one point in time. Perceptions of government attentiveness are aimed at components of the political system, not directly at officials or individuals holding power (with the possible exception of the "Congressmen" referrent).

Protest Approval.

Feminists do not seem to trust the specific officials holding office in 1972 anymore than do non-feminists, but they do do believe more in the ability of the system to attend to what its citizenry think. This explanation adds some understanding to the finding that feminists also have a significantly higher level of approval for protest as well. If distrust of officials is low and one also believes the political system itself cannot respond then why work to bring about change, to protest? If one does, however, believe the system attends and is likely to respond to protest and other demands, then it seems logical that one will be more likely to register such demands and engage in such protest. In such instances, high political trust acts as a retardant, not a catalyst, to protest activities and demands for reform. This is buttressed by our regression results which show that for feminists, a decline in political trust predicts protest approval. No such relationship is near significance for our comparison group of non-feminists. See Table 8.

INSERT TABLE 8 HERE

Other differences in the explanation of protest approval among the two groups are clear as well from Table 8. First, the reader will note that the same equation has explained more than twice the amount of variance in protest approval for feminists as for non-feminists. The association between approval for protest and a decline in political trust holds only for the feminists. Education is significant only for this group as well, with a direct relationship found. For both groups an inverse and statistically significant relationship holds between protest approval and party identification, indicating a clear association between being a strong Democrat and approving of protest. The relationship is stronger for feminists.

For both groups, feminism itself is a predictor of moderate strength. The more feminist a member of either group is, the more likely it is that she will approve of protest. The other variable most predictive of protest approval for non-feminists is their sense of internal control. As it fails so does the likelihood of protest approval. This seems to suggest that, contrary to feminists, protest approval for non-feminists is the partial effect of frustration at the inability to control the direction of one's life. For feminists the opposite seems true. A rise in sense of political efficacy occurs with an increase in protest approval. Self-confidence in certain of one's actions accompanies feminists' approval of protest, <u>not</u> a sense of low self-direction or self-control.

Political Efficacy.

We found feminists both to be significantly higher in their overall

level of political efficacy (See Table 3 again) and to evidence a stronger direct relationship between their sense of political efficacy and their sense of internal control. (See Table 9.) For both groups, however, political efficacy was most strongly predicted by internal control and by political trust. The strength of the relationship with internal control for feminists is sufficiently stronger so that it explains almost all the additional variance in political efficacy that is accounted for among the feminists. (See the R-squared in Table 9.)

INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

One of our initial hypotheses was that feminism would be associated with a higher level of political efficacy than is found among non-feminists. As the differences in means in Table 3 showed, this turned out to be the case. In addition, we found that for both the whole sample of women and for the non-feminist partition, feminism was a significant predictor of political efficacy. (R = .14 and .11, respectively.) That is, even among the non-feminists, the higher their score on the feminist index the more likely they were to have a high sense of political efficacy as well. Thus, it seems that in 1972 feminism not only intended to make women feel more politically efficacious, but also succeeded to a measureable extent to achieve that goal.

Total Political Participation

Do feminist women as a group participate more than do non-feminists? Or are they more likely to be politically alienated and non-participant? This, after all, was the question we were initially attempting to assess.

First, the answer to the first question is yes. As our difference of means showed, feminists clearly and significantly are more participant as a group than are our non-feminists. They do not give us evidence to support any argument that feminism is associating with greater political alienation among women. The contrary is true. Greater participation, not greater alienation was found, for feminists.

For purposes of this study, total political participation was a sum of traditional partisan and campaign activity, advocacy letter writing, a vote turnout total and organizational membership (excluding primarily social or fraternal organizations). The final regression equation in our path model explained 35% of the variance in participation for women (multiple R = .59). Feminism was one of the significant, although not strong predictors, of the extent of such participation (R = .11, r = .336, beta = .13).

Looking at the differences in the regression results for our two groups, some clear contrasts are noteworthy. First, among the non-feminists, feminism continues to be a significant predictor of extent of political participation. Internal control, which feminists seem to have more of, based on the means found, is directly related to participation. Political trust, which is found in comparable levels between the two groups, relates differently to the political participation of each. For the feminists, the greater the distrust, the higher the political participation. That is, those feminists with low political trust seem most likely to have high participation.

The argument found in alienation literature that the most likely candidates as reformers among the electorate are those with low political trust and high political efficacy, seems supported.[19] It is precisely these relationships that hold in the political participation of feminists: rising efficacy and declining trust associate with greater political participation. Even though feminists as a whole are not lower in political trust, it appears that there are enough feminists with low trust who are politically active to yield the statistics found. The combination of dissatisfaction, reflected in distrust, and a sense that one can be effective in influencing the system is the combination that produces political activism among feminists. See Table 10.

INSERT TABLE 10 HERE

Again, it is important to point out that the low political trust does not associate with a declining belief in the attentiveness or responsiveness of the system.[20] Rather, a rise in such a belief associates with a rise in political participation.

The reason for the higher mean in political participation of feminist women may be found in the combination of predictors for participation. (See Table 10 again.) Three of the predictors are ones which feminism explicitly or implicitly attempts to affect: internal control, political efficacy, and political trust. It well may be the combined effects of these upon political participation which contribute to the greater level of participation found among feminists. For non-feminists it appears to be the consistent relationship of feminism to various key political variables that explains the additional variance in participation accounted for in this group.

The differences in significant paths in the path models for political participation of feminists and non-feminists highlight some of these clear differences. (See Diagrams 1 and 2.) For non-feminists, the strength of their feminism continues to have direct effects on a series of relevant variables: political efficacy, protest approval, belief in government attentiveness, political trust, and political participation. It is true that one would expect fewer associations between feminism and these variables among the feminist partition of our sample since feminism has already been controlled for, in effect, by the partitioning itself. What is striking is the extent and strength of associations that feminism continues to have among those who have been somewhat arbitrarily categorized as non-feminist.

INSERT DIAGRAMS 1 AND 2 HERE

The results of our regression equations and of correlation coefficients give fairly strong support for the notion that feminism is acting as an intervening variable affecting political attitudes and behavior. Diagram 3 shows the variables that appear to show direct effects of feminism with the strengths of these effects. Table 11 presents the correlation matrix of the variables that have been discussed and gives the reader another picture of the strength and scope of associations that have been tapped in this analysis.

INSERT DIAGRAM 3 ABOUT HERE

INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

But this was an analysis of only one time point, the year 1972. Longitudinal analyses are needed to determine if these relationships hold over time, if they become strengthened or weakened, and why? What we have seen are clear signs that feminism is related to increased political participation and that the possible effect of increased political alienation for women does not appear to be occurring. While we cannot say that feminism is increasing political distrust among women, we can say that among feminists declining trust is associated with greater participation. Dissatisfaction, coupled with the higher political efficacy found among feminists, tends to combine in greater political participation as well. Whether these relationships will extend themselves over time and/or among American women at large, only time and rigorous research will tell.

Conclusions and Implications

Political ideologies often, if not generally, precede political behavior. They also tend to inform the political and, perhaps, the psychological attitudes which enhance or retard such behavior. Converse has argued for their role in constraining the electorate towards the making of rational policy decisions. Such a view assumes the voter is pursuing tangible, instrumental objectives through her or his political activity. Edelman, on the other hand, has argued for the role of political activity in serving expressive or symbolic goals and needs of the individual.[21] Ideology may establish such symbolic goals for the individual as well.

Feminist theorists such as Millett, Mitchell, Firestone and Rowbotham present clear, but varied, expositions of feminism as political ideology. They present interpretations of history and patterns of analysis which offer political interpretations of female experience as well as strategies for affecting existing conditions confronting women. We have selected as our feminism index a set of items which could be argued to tap both instrumental and symbolic concerns. The individual's own weighting of these items within her own priority framework, as well as her personal response to feminism on a broader plane, could, we have argued, logically lead to either of two consequences: greater alienation from the political system or greater participation within it. Either route--greater cynicism, distrust and alienation, or deeper involvement and effort at affecting change--have potentially great consequences for the political system. Our task was to assess, if we could, which of the two alternatives appeared to be occurring.

Three objects of investigation--psychological attitudes, political attitudes, and political behavior--were focused upon as a means of assessing whether the contemporary women's movement was having any broad political impact upon the female electorate. Theoretically, the argument was made that feminism could have either of two likely consequences for the following reasons. If the consciousness-raising arm of the movement was succeeding in heightening political distrust among women and lowering their perceptions of government attentiveness, then greater alienation could result. Feminist women well might throw their hands up in frustration and forsake or substantially reduce whatever political involvement they had with the traditional political system.

After all, if it can't be trusted, and if it doesn't listen (much less respond), then why beat one's head against the wall? Why not simply withdraw politically?

On the other hand, feminism urges its followers to get in there and pitch. It complains that women have been passive for far too long, that it's about time they did something about the way things are. It encourages rocking the boat. Furthermore, feminism encourages women to develop the skills and abilities they need to get things done. In short, it attempts to strengthen female self-esteem and encourages activism.

We asked if either of these alternatives was occurring and attempted to measure this empirically. Our findings supported 3 out of the 4 hypotheses originally posited. They pointed to feminism as a catalyst towards greater political participation of women. Let us review.

Our first hypothesis--that feminism would be associated with low political trust--has not been supported. While slight negative associations between feminism and political trust were found, there was no significant difference in the means for political trust found between our feminist and non-feminist partitions. Thus, we cannot infer that feminism is significantly contributing to low political trust.

Our second hypothesis--that feminists will have higher life satisfaction than non-feminists was strongly supported. A significant difference in means was found between the two groups and even among non-feminists, feminist inclination was associated with heightened life satisfaction. It is important to note, however, that our underlying assumption was that life satisfaction would be a more significant predictor of political attitudes and behavior than turned out to be the case. Of the two key psychological attitudes investigated, internal control proved to be consistently more strongly related to political attitudes and behavior than did life satisfaction.

Thirdly, we hypothesized greater political efficacy and a higher sense of internal control among feminists than among non-feminists. In both instances our hypothesis was strongly supported. Further, we found consistently strong associations between sense of internal control and political attitudes and behavior.

Fourthly, greater political participation was posited for feminists than for non-feminists. Again, strong support was found for this hypothesis. The mean total for political participation for feminists was approximately one-third higher than that found among non-feminists.

The image we are left with concerning feminists as compared to non-feminists is a clear and relatively coherent one. Psychologically, feminists seem to have a stronger sense of internal control or self-directedness, and a higher level of total life satisfaction. Politically, their attitudes differ noticeably as do the relationships between these attitudes and political participation. While not significantly different from non-feminists in average level of political trust, participation among feminists tends to rise as trust decreases. That is, less trustful feminists appear to be among the most active politically. Feminists are far more approving of political protest. Their sense of political efficacy is significantly higher than that of non-feminists as is their belief in government attentiveness.

Behaviorally, feminists were participating more politically in 1972 than non-feminists. Thus, each of our three areas of investigation--psychological attitudes, political attitudes and political behavior--convey an image of feminist women as significantly different from the data yielded by our non-feminist sample. In short, we found feminists to be more activist than non-feminists, and we did not find them verging on the brink of political alienation in any discernible way. The consistency and strength of our findings discounts the possibility that politically relevant consequences of feminism are randomly distributed. Cumulative relationships were clear and measurable.

The skeptic can properly say, here, that we have proved nothing, that feminism is not necessarily influential in the ways being argued. Only one time point has been investigated. The relationships found may be spurious. Feminism may simply be aggregating to it women with the characteristics we have just described.

To such a critic two responses are offered. First, even if such aggregation were the case, any social movement with the capability of gathering to it persons with the self-directedness and political orientation found in these data is in itself worth serious study and would appear to have the potential of placing serious demands for reform upon the system. Two, in no way does this study claim to have proven causality. Certain statistical inferences have been possible. Certain relationships have been found. But only one time point has been investigated. Others are invited to extend a similar effort over time.

Clearly, this is an exploratory effort. Longitudinal study is needed. Comparison between the sexes as well as between feminist and non-feminist women is needed. Much yet needs to be sorted out. Do the psychological variables such as internal control and life satisfaction form prior to one's orientation as a feminist? To what extend does feminism alter these? Is ideology prior to political attitudes? Has feminism positively enhanced female self-esteem in any significant and measurable way? Or has it merely attracted to it a large preponderance of women already comparatively high in their self-esteem? Further refined analysis needs to compare high activist feminist women with low activist feminists to determine if those who are high participants are also high in self-esteem as Sniderman would contend or if they are low in self-esteem and tend to support a Lasswellian orientation to political leadership. And most crucially, continued work needs to be done to determine if the greater political participation of women can make any significant difference in the political system itself and its ultimate allocation of rewards. This may be the crucial and final factor determining whether feminism continues to increase the political participation of women or whether what seems to be beginning so well might not diverge into political alienation after all.

NOTES

[1]For extended discussions of the relationship between social movements and political change see Amitai and Eva Etzioni, Social Change (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964) and John Eric Nordskog, Contemporary Social Reform Movements (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954). Also, Roberta Ash, Social Movements in America (Chicago: Markham, 1972).

[2]Etzioni, op. cit., p. 75.

[3]E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 42.

[4]Jo Freeman discusses this role of social movements in some depth in the introduction to her book, The Politics of Women's Liberation (New York: David McKay Company, Inc.,1975).

[5]Social movements have been classified and defined in a congeries of ways. For practical purposes, and because I find more substance to it than many definitions, Roberta Ash's conception of a social movement is the one I am referring to conceptually. Ash defines a social movement as "a set of attitudes and self-conscious action on the part of a group of people directed toward change in the social structure and/or ideology of a society and carried on outside of ideologically legitimated channels or which uses these channels in innovative ways." Ash, op. cit., p. 1. There seems little question that the current feminist movement fits this definition, in spite of its diversity both ideologically and in terms of espoused tactics by different branches of the movement.

[6]While ideology, too, has been the subject of a variety of definitions, I assume a concept of ideology very much akin to Converse's. Ideology, in some way, is assumed to exercise certain constraints upon other related attitudes, opinions, issue positions, etc. See Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, eds., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

[7]For instance, Easton and Dennis in Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) clearly found sex differences too small to be of great consequence for the operation of the political system. Other recent findings have also shown sex differences to be reduced in most areas of political participation and with reference to political attitudes such as trust and efficacy as well. See, for instance, M. Kent Jennings and Norman Thomas, "Men and Women in Party Elites: Social Roles and Political Resources," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII (November, 1968), 469-492, and Susan Hansen, et al., "Women's Political Participation and Policy Preferences," Social Science Quarterly, 56 (March 1976), 576-590.

[8]In many ways the black civil rights movement of the 1960s was quite comparable in its objectives for blacks to the current feminist movement and its objectives for women (and to a lesser extent, men) in the 1970s. Verba and Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), found the

movement among blacks resulted in an increase in their distrust of the political process but also an increase in their political participation.

[9]NOW, NWPC and WEAL refer to the National Organization for Women, the National Women's Political Caucus, and the Women's Equity Action League, respectively.

[10]This thesis was strongly substantiated by Paul Sniderman, Personality and the Democratic Process (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974) and by James David Barber in The Making of Presidential Character (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

[11]See David Schwartz' description of political alienation as characterized by political disinterest, low efficacy, low trust, low support for the political system, non-voting and low political activity on a variety of measures. David C. Schwartz, "Political Alienation," in Feierabend, Feierabend and Gurr, Anger, Violence and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972). James D. Wright, The Dissent of the Governed (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1976) treats these relationships extensively as well.

[12]Of course, this also assumes a belief in the political system's capacity to respond to change. In short, it assumes that participation can or is likely to make a difference, that the system will respond. Evidence for this is obviously quite mixed.

[13]For applicability of factor analysis to this kind of data see R. J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), Chapters 2 and 34.

[14]Converse, op. cit.

[15]The author is currently incorporating this analysis into a longitudinal one covering the years 1964-1976.

[16]Cooley, Charles H., Social Process (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966) and also Michael Young and Peter Willmott, The Symmetrical Family (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

[17]The coefficient of a predictor variable generally was required to be equal to twice the standard error of that variable in at least one of the partitions for which it was entered (i.e., feminists, non-feminists or the whole sample of women). If this criterion was not met and if theoretical reasons were not compelling, it was dropped from the final path model and the equation re-estimated. See J. Johnson, Econometric Methods, 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 192-207.

[18]Wright, op. cit., chapter 4, gives extensive support for the high correlation between high economic status and high political trust. He reports correlation coefficients of .464 for political trust of blacks, .591 for blue collar whites and .556 for white collar whites, in 1968. (page 93).

[19]See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), Chapter 17.

[20]This is posited by Ada Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation," APSR 64 (June): 389-410; and by Arthur Miller, "Social Denormatization and Political Trust," University of Michigan, 1975, unpublished paper.

[21]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

TABLE 1: Factor Loadings of Items in Feminism Index
(Principal Components Method)

	Factor 1: Perceptions of Women	Factor 2: Equal Opportunity	Factor 3: Need for Change
Women should have equal roles	.625	.171	.100
Men are not born with more drive	.599	-.196	.264
Women are not less reliable than men	.670	-.091	-.174
Women are not necessarily happiest when homemaking and mothering	.613	.035	.147
Women don't have the same chance as men	.618	.290	-.046
Society discriminates against women	.408	.548	.194
Women have less educational opportunity	-.027	.684	-.096
Women can't get as good jobs as men can	.125	.666	-.041
Schools teach women to want less important jobs	-.070	.554	.519
Equality has not gone far enough	.120	-.095	.827
Men have a better life overall	-.280	-.174	.008
			Total
% of total variance explained	20.3%	15.6%	10.3% 46.2%
% of explained variance	43.9%	33.8%	22.3% 100%

[a]Varimax method, orthogonal rotation

TABLE 2: Demographic Variables Among Feminists and Non-Feminists[a]

	Feminists N=183	Non-Feminists N=446
Political Philosophy		
Liberal	13%	8%
Moderate	74%	75%
Conservative	13%	17%
Party Identification		
Democrat	43%	41%
Republican	25%	25%
Independent	32%	34%
Race		
White	88%	86%
Black	11%	12%
Other	1%	2%
Education[1]		
Grammar School	4%	24%
Some High School	11%	26%
High School Graduate	63%	45%
College Graduate	17%	4%
College Graduate	5%	1%
Graduate School		
Income[2]		
0-$4,999	10%	12%
$5,000-$9,000	11%	31%
$10,000-14,000	31%	26%
$15,000-19,000	24%	17%
$20,000-24,999	13%	5%
$25,000 and over	11%	9%
Social Class (Self-Evaluation)[3]		
Lower Class	31%	48%
Working Class	9%	9%
Middle Class	43%	36%
Upper Middle or Upper Class	17%	7%
Geographic Region[4]		
East	26%	18%
Midwest	28%	29%
South	27%	38%
West	20%	14%

TABLE 2 (cont'd)

	Feminists N=183	Non-Feminists N=446
Marital Status[5]		
Married	65%	61%
Separated	2%	4%
Divorced	6%	6%
Widowed	11%	21%
Never Married	16%	9%
Employment Status[6]		
Housewife	31%	55%
Retired	6%	7%
Student	3%	2%
Unemployed	2%	4%
Working	58%	33%
Age[7]		
Under 25	24%	15%
25-40	33%	25%
41-55	24%	24%
56-99	19%	36%

[a]Totals for each variable equal 100%.

[1]Education: Chi-square = 82.87
D.f. = 4
Prob. < .001
Gamma = .65

[2]Income: Chi-square = 24.25
D.f. = 5
Prob. < .001
Gamma = .29

[3]Social Class: Chi-square = 23.09
D.f. = 3
Prob. < .001
Gamma = .32

[4]Geographic Region: Chi-square = 10.28
D.f. = 3
Prob. < .02
Gamma = -.06

[5]Marital Status: Chi-square = 15.11
D.f. = 4
Prob. = .01
Gamma = -.04

[6]Employment Status: Chi-square = 34.10
D.f. = 4
Prob. < .01
Gamma = .42

[7]Age: Chi-square = 20.93
D.f. = 3
Prob. = .001
Gamma = -.29

TABLE 3: Comparison of Means between Feminists, Non-Feminists and Men On Certain Sociological, Psychological and Political Variables[a]

	$\bar{X}$			Variable
	Feminists N=183	Non-Feminists N=446	Men N=480	Range
Sociological Variables				
Age	39.2**	47.2	42.5	11-93
Education	15.8**	12.6	14.1	1-20
Composite SES	40.9**	35.8	33.9	3-60
Employment Status	4.1**	3.0	5.2	1-6
Party Identification	3.4	3.6	3.5	1-7
Psychological Variables				
Happiness	7.6	7.7		3-15
Internal-External	10.9**	8.9	10.7	4-20
Life Satisfaction	43.7**	38.6	44.2	10-70
Political Variables				
Political Trust	12.3	11.9	10.7	5-25
Political Efficacy	12.3**	9.5	11.2	4-20
Government Attentiveness, Belief in	16.6*	14.6	16.1	5-25
Protest Approval	8.1**	6.4	7.0	3-15
Total Participation	41.0**	33.7	38.2	20-80

*Signif. = .05
**Signif. = .01

[a]Men were not included in the difference of means t-test as a third comparison group. Statistics for men are reported where available for reader interest and later discussion in the article.

TABLE 4: Regression of Attitudinal Variables
Against Life Satisfaction of Feminists (F) and Non-Feminists (N-F)

	Standardized R		Beta		R^2	
Independent Variables	F	N-F	F	N-F	F	N-F
Internal Control	.45**	.28**	.41	.28	.39	.32
Government Attentiveness	.19	.28**	.17	.28		
Political Trust	-.13*	-.04	-.13	-.04		
Party Identification[a]	-.15*	-.02	-.15	-.02		
Feminism	.04	.15**	.05	.15		
Protest Approval	.01	.09*	.01	.11		

*p. = .05

**p. = .01

[a]Party identification was coded such that a negative change from the mean indicates identification with the Democratic party, a positive change from the mean indicates Republican party identification. Party identification was coded on the traditional 7-point scale ranging from '1' (strong Democrat) to '7' (strong Republican).

TABLE 5: Relationships of Psychological Variables to Political Variables for Feminists and Non-Feminists
(Entries are standardized R)

Dependent Variables	Internal Control		Life Satisfaction	
	Feminists	Non-Feminists	Feminists	Non-Feminists
Political Trust	.269**	.409**	.088	.214**
Political Efficacy	.515**	.581**	.361**	.384**
Belief in Government Attentiveness	.524**	.442**	.422**	.486**
Protest Approval	-.015	-.106	.048	.111
Total Participation	.390**	.383**	.315**	.330**

*p. = .05
**p. = .01

TABLE 6: Predictors of Political Trust for Feminists and Non-Feminists

Independent Variables	Feminists	Non-Feminists
Party Identification	.15*	-.02
Protest Approval	-.25**	.01
Political Efficacy	.45**	.36**
Internal Control	.05	.11*
SES	-.09	.12*
R^2	.30	.19

*p. = .05
**p. - .01

TABLE 7: Regression of Attitudinal Variables
Against Government Attentiveness for Feminists and Non-Feminists
(Entries are Standardized R)

Attitudinal Variables	Feminists	Non-Feminists
Feminism	.15**	.03
Internal Control	.19**	.17**
Political Efficacy	.39**	.36**
Life Satisfaction	.15*	.23**
Protest Approval	.12*	.06
Political Trust	.14*	.16**
R^2	.46	.45

*p. = .05
**p. = .01

TABLE 8: Regression of Demographic and Attitudinal Variables
Against Protest Approval for Feminists and Non-Feminists
(Entries are Standardized R)

Independent Variables	Feminists	Non-Feminists
Education	.14*	.09
Party Identification	-.18**	-.11*
Internal Control	-.04	-.18**
Feminism	.31**	.23**
Political Trust	-.28**	.02
Political Efficacy	.12	-.01
R^2	.20	.08

*p. = .05
**p. = .01

TABLE 9: Regression of Demographic and Attitudinal Variables on Political Efficacy of Feminists and Non-Feminists[a]

Independent Variables	Feminists	Non-Feminists
Education	.15*	.13**
Party Identification	.04	.05
Age	.02	.04
Feminism	.07	.15**
Internal Control	.38**	.35
Political Trust	.36**	.32**
Government Attentiveness	.09	-.00
R^2	.41	.35
*p. = .05	N = 183	N = 446
**p. = .01		

[a]Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

TABLE 10: Regression of Demographic and Attitudinal Variables On Total Political Participation of Feminists and Non-Feminists[a]

Independent Variables	Feminists	Non-Feminists
Education	.16*	.14**
Age	.03	.08*
Feminism	-.02	.11*
Internal Control	.12	.14**
Political Efficacy	.28**	.24**
Political Trust	-.19**	-.02
Government Attentiveness	.18*	.10*
R^2	.25	.31
*p. = .05	N = 183	N = 446
**p. = .01		

[a]Entries are standardized regression coefficients.

DIAGRAM 1: Path Model for Political Participation for Feminists
(N = 183)



* p. = .05

** p. = .01

Claire Fulenwider Knoche

DIAGRAM 2: Path Model for Political Participation of Non-Feminists (N = 446)



*p. = .05
**p. = .01

DIAGRAM 3: Strength of Relationships Between Feminism, Attitudinal and Behavioral Variables (Entires are standardized R)



*p. = .05
**p. = .01
N = 629 (all women)

TABLE 11: Correlation Matrix for Feminism, Attitudinal and Behavioral Variables for All Women (N = 629)[a]

	Fem.	Life Satis.	Int. Control	Pol. Effic.	Pol. Trust	Govt. Resp.	Prot. Approval	Partic.
Feminism	1.000							
Life Satisfaction	.282	1.000						
Internal Control	.259	.484	1.000					
Political Efficacy	.315	.399	.453	1.000				
Political Trust	.110	.186	.277	.438	1.000			
Govt. Attentiveness	.276	.486	.478	.601	.404	1.000		
Protest Approval	.348	.133	-.038	.068	-.060	.072	1.000	
Participation	.336	.352	.420	.482	.190	.419	.098	1.000

[a]All coefficients above .20 were significant at the .001 level based on Z-transformation probability tests.